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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF' UTAH 
---00000---
COX CONSTRUCTIOU COMPANY, 
INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 15499 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
---00000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---00000---
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the propriety of an award of 
interest by the Court on three separate amounts which were 
d,etermined to be due and owing Respondent and which had 
been paid by Appellant and accepted by Respondent without 
the mention of interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment seeking an award of interest on three separate amounts 
previously determined to be due and owing Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellants contention in opposition to Respondent's motion 
was that the amounts paid constituted an accord and satis-
faction. The trial Court, Judge Marcellus K. Snow, presiding 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent and 
against Appellant for the sum of $21,532.24 which was enterec 
of record on the 30th day of August, 1977. Defendant-Appel-
lant State Road Commission now known as the Utah Department 
of Transportation appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the partial summary 
judgment and a judgment denying Respondents claim for 
interest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 29, 1971 the parties entered 
into an arbitration agreement which agreement involved 
claims for additional payment allegedly due Respondent on 
nine separate highways projects. (Exhibit 1 to affidavit 
in support of motion for partial summary judgment dated 
November 19, 1976.) The second paragraph of said agreement 
obligates Respondent to file its claims with full.· document< 
tion within 90 days from the receipt of project documents 
which were made available to Respondent at the time the agr1 
ment was consummated. 
Pursuant to the arbitration agreement part of the 
dispute between the parties on Project FLH-42(6) second 
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contract and S-037(4) first contract, Poison Springs Wash 
to Trachyte Junction was decided by the arbitration panel 
on December 28, 1972 (Exhibit 5 to affidavit in Support of 
motion for partial summary judgment). The panel awarded 
the sum of $1,745 and the parties agreed to the payment of 
additional sums which together totaled $23,279.98. (See Ex-
hibit A attached to affidavit of Don R. Strong in opposi-
tion to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment dated 
December, 1976.) Said Exhibit A just referred to is a letter 
from Respondent's counsel and makes no reference to interest 
on the agreed amounts. The amount referred to was paid 
March 19, 1973. The final estimate invoice was submitted 
on said project on May 20, 1969. (Affidavit in Support of 
motion -for partial summary judgment.) 
The claims on the project designated as FLH 42(6) 
third contract and s-0370(4) second contract, Hanksville to 
Poison Springs Wash were settled by stipulation dated the 
15th day of February, 1974 for the total sum of $15,134.47, 
and said sum was paid March 21, 1974. (See paragraph 8 of 
affidavit in support of motion for partial summary j·udgment 
and Exhibit 3 attached thereto.) No provision for interest 
is made or referred to in the stipulation. 
The claims of Project I-IG-15-8(26) 357 and F-FG-
001-8(4), North Perry to US-30-S 14th South Street to I-15 
and US-30 were settled by stipulation between the parties 
- 3 -
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on July 20, 1974. The total amount agreed upon was 
$28,808.72, and said sum was paid July 22, 1974. The final 
estimate invoice was submitted October S, 1967. Again no 
reference is made in the stiputlation to interest. (See 
affidavit in support of motion for partial summary judgment, 
paragraph 8 and Exhibit 2.) 
The stipulations referred to were prepared by 
counsel for Respondent. (See letter dated July 5, 1974 
signed by John F. Piercey attached to affidavit of Leland 
D. Ford attached to motion for summary judgment denying in-
terest on amounts paid under stipulation, etc.) 
All three of the projects referred to were 
settled for less than the original claimed amounts. (See 
affidavits of Leland D. Ford and Don R. Strong in opposition 
to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.) 
The original arbitration agreement does reserve 
all questions of law to be heard by a District Judge of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County. (EighV 
paragraph of arbitration agreement which is Exhibit 1 to af-
fidavit in support of motion for summary ju~gment) . None of 
the stipulations or other documents connected with these thre 
projects reserve the question of interest payment. Responde 
motion for partial summary judgment on the three projects ii 
question was filed in November, 1976 which is 28 months afte 
the last project had apparently been settled. 
- 4 -
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During the time that the stipulations were being 
arrived at and prior thereto it was mutually understood by 
counsel for the respective parties that interest on claims 
of this nature was not paid by the state. (See affidavits 
of Leland D. Ford and Don R. Strong in oppostion to plain-
tiff's motion for partial summary judgment). Respondent's 
motion for partial summary judgment was filed on the 19th 
day of November, 1976. It was heard on the 27th day of July, 
1977 and judgment entered on August 30, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STIPULATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
CONSTITUTE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
The-general law on accord and satisfaction is ex-
pressed in 1 AmJur. 2d 330 (Sec. 33, Accord and Satisfaction) 
wherein it is stated as follows: 
Where a claim is unliquidated, or, if 
liquidated, there is a bona fide doubt 
or controversy exists as to whether any-
thing is due, then an accord and satis-
faction may be established and held bind-
ing, although there is payment of a sum 
less than that claimed by the creditor, or 
even a sum less than that which, on an 
actual computation, might be found due to 
the creditor. The consideration in the 
settlement of such a claim lies in the 
mutual concessions of the parties, ••• " 
(Citing among other cases the case of Ralph 
A. Badger & co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan 
Association, 94 U. 97, 75 P.2d 669.) 
- 5 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is further stated in 1 AmJur. 2d at page 348 
under section 52 dealing with the effect of accord and satis 
faction as follows: 
If the accord constitutes a binding con-
tract and it is fully performed, the per-
formance satisfies the original claim and 
operates as a final bar to the demand or 
subject matter of the agreement for accord 
and satisfaction. (Citing several cases 
along with the following: 
The voluntary settlement of differ-
ences between parties in respect of 
their rights, where all have the same 
knowledge or means of obtaining knowl-
edge concerning the circumstances and 
there are no frauds, misrepresentations, 
concealments, or other misleading inci-
dents, must stand and be enforced, al-
though the settlement made by the 
parties in their agreement might not 
be that which the court could have 
decreed had the controversy been 
brought before it for decision. Young 
v. Stephenson, 82 Okla. 239, 200 P. 225, 
24 A.L.R. 978, emphasis supplied.) 
Appellant submits that the emphasized statement 
above exactly fits the facts of this matter. There was a 
bona fide accord between the parties on the three cases in-
valved as to sums to be paid in satisfaction of Respondent'~ 
claims. The sums upon which accord was reached were all 
paid, thus performing the accord. This was a "voluntary 
settlement" by the parties. In light of the recent pro-
nouncements of the Utah Supreme Court regarding the payment 
of interest on claims of this nature in the cases of ~ 
Pipeline-corporation v. V'7hite Superior Co., 546 P.2 885 and 
- 6 -
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Jack B. Parson Company vs. State of Utah, 552 P.2 107, 
the accord conceivably "might not be that which the Court 
would have decreed had the controversy been brought before 
it for decision." It is submitted that this Court should 
refuse to upset the accord and satisfaction which the 
parties freely entered into by an award of interest in addi-
tion to the agreed settlement figure. 
The following statement from the Badger case, 
supra, seems to Appellant to be dispositive: 
••. In the case last cited (Browning v. 
Equitable Life Assn. Soc. of U.S., 72 
P.2d 1960) we said: An accord is an 
agreement between parties, one to give 
or perform, the other to receive or ac-
cept, such agreed payment or performance 
in satisfaction of a claim. The 'satis-
faction' is the consWTl!llation of such agree-
- ment~ Settlement of an unliquidated or 
disputed claim where the parties are apart 
in good faith presents such consideration •.•• 
POINT II 
WHEN THE STIPULATIONS AT ISSUE WERE 
ENTERED INTO THE PARTIES BELIEVED THAT 
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY 
INTEREST AND INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SHOULD 
BE TERMINATED APRIL 29, 1971. 
The recent cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Uinta Pipeline Corporation v.· White Superior and Jack B. 
Parson construction Company vs. State of Utah, supra, have 
established the requirement by the State to pay interest on 
- 7 -
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unliquidated claims, such as the three claims which were 
settled by stipulation, and which form the basis of Respon-
dent's motion for partial sununary judgment. At the time 
the three stipulations which are at issue were entered into 
it was the mutual understanding of counsel for both parties 
that the State of Utah was not obligated to pay interest 
on claims of this nature. Respondent well knows that the 
State had traditionally not paid interest on claims of 
this nature. Counsel for the parties had discussed this 
on numerous occasions and the assertion of Appellant's 
counsel that this was in fact the understanding of Respon-
dent's counsel is unchallenged. (See affidavits of Leland 
D. Ford and Don R. Strong in opposition to plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment.) The fact that this 
may have been erroneous should not affect the settlements 
arrived at. The settlements were arrived at with the under-
standing that interest was not payable and may or may not 
have been influenced as to amount by that now apparent 
erroneous conclusion. To allow the recovery of interest 
at this point would work an injustice and result in a wind-
fall to Respondent. 
It should be further pointed out that the claims 
were all filed well beyond the 90-day provision set forth 
in the stipulation entered into between the parties (Exhibit 
1 to the-a.ffidavit of Cecil Cox in support of plaintiff's 
- 8 -
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motion for summary judgment.) The timeliness of the 90-
day provision while important in the ultimate resolution 
of the claims was not considered critical by Appellant 
until the reality of the payment of interest was decided 
by the recent decisions of this Court in Uinta Pipeline and 
Jack B. Parson, supra. By Respondent's failure to file its 
claim within the 90-day period it forces Appellant to pay 
increased interest by the simple device of delaying the 
filing of claims. As long as interest was not being paid 
the urgency of enforcing the 90-day provision was not 
apparent to Appellant. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that if the 
Court in fact deems that interest must be paid by Appellant, 
then it is respectfully submitted that that interest require-
ment should terminate 90 days from the date of the execution 
of the agreement between the parties to arbitrate the various 
claims. Respondent has in fact been delinquent since that 
date in the filing if its claims and should not profit be-
cause of its own delinquency when that delinquency is not 
in any way attributable to Appellant. The 90-day period 
from the date of the original agreement would end April 29, 
1971, and it is respectfully submitted that no interest 
should be allowed Respondent for any reason beyond said date 
unless its submission to the arbitration panel was made with-
in the 90-day period. 
- 9 -
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POINT III 
IF THE STIPULATIONS AT ISSUE CREATE AN 
AMBIGUITY THEY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST 
RESPONDENT SINCE THEY WERE DRAFTED 
BY RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL. 
Appellant submits that if the Court is of the 
opinion that by failing to specifically refer to interest 
the stipulations are ambiguous, then it is respectfully 
submitted by Appellant that they should be construed 
against Respondent since all three stipulations were draftee 
by Respondent's counsel. 
This Court has recently spoken on this point in 
the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Midwest Realty & 
Finance, Inc., a 1975 case found at 544 P.2d 882. At page 
885 the Court makes this statement: 
••• In dealing with a document which is 
ambiguous or uncertain, the general rule 
is that it should be construed strictly 
against the party who wrote it (Midwest) 
and favorably to the other party against 
whom it is envoked (Wells Fargo). Further, 
when a document is of that character, the 
trial court can take extraneous evidence 
and look to the total circumstances to de-
termine what the parties should reasonably 
be deemed to have understood thereby. These 
principles are to be considered together with 
this further proposition: That where there 
was dispute, it is the prerogative of the 
trial court to determine whose evidence he 
will believe. 
It is further submitted by Appellant that when th1 
stipulations were entered into they clearly were intended ti 
complete-ly resolve the issues between the parties as to the 
- 10 -
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claims covered by the stipulations. This is apparent from 
the letter dated July 5, 1974 from Respondent's counsel to 
Appellant's counsel which accompanied the stipulation be-
tween the parties on the North Perry to U.S. 30-S or Brigham 
City claim. That letter reads as follows (omitting heading 
and reference line) : 
Dear Lee: 
I believe the enclosed stipulation sets 
forth our settlement on the Brigham City 
claim. If you have any changes or suggestions, 
please call me. If it meets with your approval, 
please sign and return the original and one 
copy to me. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
John F. Piercey 
Note the use of the word "settlement." There was no question 
of the intent of the parties in July of 1974 that the entire 
matter was being "settled" by the agreement to pay the 
sum as set forth in that document. Likewise for the two 
other projects. 
This Court has in the recent case of Big Butte Ranch, 
Inc. vs. Marjorie R. Holm, et al. (Case No. 14630 decided 
October 3, 1977) stated the following: 
.•• to ascertain the meaning of the agreements, 
the Court should first examine the language 
of the instruments and accord to it the 
weight and effect which it may show was in-
tended and if the meaning is ambiguous or 
uncertain then consider parol evidence of 
the parties' intentions. (citing Mathis v. 
Madsen, 1 u 246, 261 P.2 952 ••• 
- 11 -
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Using this approach, if the agreement and the letter are 
fairly interpreted, the payment of interest should not 
be allowed. On the other hand, if they are deemed to be 
ambiguous then the parol evidence is that it was under-
stood by counsel for the parties that interest was not in 
the contemplation of the parties due on the agreed settle-
metn amounts. 
According to the following language from the Lake v. 
Hermes Associates, 552 P.2 126 (1976) it is proper for 
this Court to make its own interpretation of the documents 
in question. In the cited case this Court said the followir 
••. However, in a case of this nature, where 
the resolution of the controversy depends upon 
the meaning to be given documents, the trial 
court is in no more favored position and is 
no better able to determine the meaning of 
such documents than is this Court. There-
fore, as to such an issue, those presumptions 
do not apply. (citing Burns V. Skopstad, 69 
Idaho 227, 206 P.2d 765 (1949)). 
It is therefore clear that this Court can examine the docu-
ments which create the dispute and the circumstances and 
events leading up to the execution of the documents and 
examine the language to determine whether or not they were 
intended to be full and complete payment to respondent as 
urged to Appellant. If they are ambiguous it is submitted 
that the ambiguity should be resolved against Respondent. 
- 12 -
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POINT IV 
THE THREE STIPULATIONS BY THEIR TERMS 
DO NOT REFER TO ANY RESERVATION INVOLVING 
THE ORIGINAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
ON LEGAL QUESTIONS. 
One of the Respondent's arguments is that all ques-
tions of law in dealings before the arbitration panel were 
to be reserved for a determination by the Third District 
Court. Appellant submits that since all three stipulations 
were entered into subsequent to that original stipulation 
and since none of the three stipulations by their terms 
make reference to the original arbitration agreement re-
servations, as to legal questions that they are intended to 
supersede said document insofar as the stipulations are 
concerned with various individual projects. They do not, 
in fact, make any reservation for later determination 
except a few factual disputes to be solved by reference 
to the panel and as to the individual projects they super-
sede and replace the original agreement to arbitrate. 
Since by their own terms there is not a provision for in-
terest it is improper to insert same judicially. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT'S RECEIPT OF PAYMENT AND SILENCE 
IN DEMANDING THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST FOR 
28 MONTHS SHOULD ESTOP RESPONDENT FROM 
NOW ASSERTING ITS CLAIM FOR SAME. 
The payments made on the three projects referred to 
above by Appellant to Respondent occurred more than 28 months 
- 13 -
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prior to the filing of the motion for partial summary judg-
ment. No request or demand for the payment of the accrued 
interest on the amounts found to be due and owing was 
ever made to Respondent from and after the dates of payment, 
In the Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs. Marjorie R. Holm, 
et al. case, supra, this Court has stated the following: 
••• The test of estoppel is objective in 
nature as to what a reasonable person, 
under the circumstances, might conclude 
(citing Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Ut. 
2d 4 7, 513 p. 2 41 7 ( 19 7 3) ••• 
It is respectfully submitted that silence by re-
spondent over such an extended period is enough to raise an 
estoppel, particularly when it is coupled with the written 
stipulations and with the other communications which make 
reference to the agreed amounts as "settlements" and when 
no reference is madG to interest at any time. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
of the trial court in awarding summary judgment against 
appellant for the sum of $21,532.24 is erroneous. It is 
barred by the accord and satisfaction reached between the 
parties which in each instance involving the three projects 
referred to was in excess of 28 months prior to the filing 
of a motion for partial summary judgment by respondent clai 
ing interest on the agreed sums. 
If the accord and satisfaction of the parties does 
- 14 -
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not bar recovery then Appellant respectfully submits that 
Respondent will reap a windfall based on a mutual mistake 
by the parties and it is simply inequitable to allow Respon-
dent to recover on that basis. 
Appellant further submits that at the very least the 
stipulations involved in the three cases were prepared by 
Respondent's counsel and do not provide for interest nor do 
they reserve that question for future determination. The 
original agreement to arbitrate the disputes proved for a 
reservation of legal questions, but the stipulations super-
sede and replace the original agreement and if by their 
failure to resolve the question of interest they are obvious-
ly arnbiguous.--The general rule and certainly the Utah rule 
would resolve said ambiguity against the Respondent. 
It is also apparent that Respondent has been in 
default of the original agreement to arbitrate in that he 
did not file his claim within the 90-day period specified 
in the arbitration agreement and should not profit as a 
result of his own lack of diligence. 
Finally, Appellant also submits that the continued 
silence of Respondent for a period in excess of 28 months 
from the date upon which the last payment was made by Appel-
lant to Respondent should estop Respondent from recovery of 
any additional sum. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
- 15 -
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should be reversed by this Court and additionally that Re-
spondent's motion for partial summary judgment should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
~~7ll 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies each of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid 
to John F. _Pie~cey, 72 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, Attorney for Respondent, this 12th day of 
December, 1977. 
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